Global public-private partnerships against neglected diseases: building governance structures for effective outcomes by BUCKUP, SEBASTIAN
Global public–private partnerships against
neglected diseases: building governance
structures for effective outcomes
SEBASTIAN BUCKUP*
Global Partnership Governance Initiative, Switzerland
Abstract: Focusing on the problem of pharmaceutical R&D for drugs and
vaccines against neglected diseases in developing countries, this article argues
that the effectiveness of global health partnerships potentially lies in their
capacity to address the problem of dual market failures: on a first level they may
tackle the poverty induced lack of effective demand for health products which
impedes the creation of market-financed innovative products. On a second level,
they may help overcoming hold-up problems and underinvestment induced by
the complexity of neglected diseases R&D. Yet, organizing transactions within a
partnership is not a panacea against these problems: a crucial determinant of
success is proper ownership structures. They need to respond to (i) the degree to
which the respective parties value the partnership outcome, (ii) the relative
importance of the investment of the parties, and (iii) the nature of the
partnership outcome. The argument developed in the analysis is built on an
integrated framework combining insights from incomplete contracting theory
and public goods economics. It is supported by a preliminary statistical analysis
of 17 GHPs.
1. Introduction
The emergence of global health partnerships
Many diseases in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) are being charac-
terized by a lack of commercial incentives to trigger private investment in R&D.
Diseases such as Malaria, Tuberculosis, Chagas, and others, often affect mil-
lions of patients whose lack of ability to pay for market-financed products
means there is still no market for drug developers to exploit. Because of that,
they are also referred to as neglected diseases (NDs) (Nwaka and Ridley,
2003: 919). Since the mid-1990s a number of global health partnerships
(GHP) between public and private actors have emerged to narrow this gap.
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The reasons for that have been traced back to both paradigm shifts in the devel-
opment discourse and changes of interests in a globalizing world.1 Yet, looking
ahead, it is of greatest importance to understand how sustainable these innova-
tions are: are GHPs just a passing fad or are they here to stay as a fundamental
pillar of governance in an emerging global public domain?
This paper argues that the answer to this question must flow from the con-
clusions reached about the effectiveness of the approach as a system of govern-
ance. It shows that GHPs as a form of organizational integration are effective
when helping to overcome hold-up problems created through strategic beha-
viour of market actors in case of complex transactions, which make complete,
contingent contracts infeasible. The argument developed in the analysis is built
on an integrated framework combining insights from incomplete contracting
theory and public goods economics. It is supported by a preliminary statistical
analysis of 17 global partnerships for drug and vaccine development (see
Table 1). The aim of the study is first to enhance the theoretical understanding
1 For paradigmatic explanations see e.g. Biersteker (1995), Jayasuriya (2001); Changes of interests
particularly regarding global security threats have been extensively discussed by Kaul et al. (2003),
Kaul and Conceic¸a˜o (2006), Kickbusch and Buse (2006), or Brundtland (2003).
Table 1. GHPs for drug and vaccine development
Acronym Name
Aeras Aeras, Global TB Vaccine Foundation
CDND Consortium to Develop New Drugs
CICCR* Consortium for Industrial Collaboration in Contraceptive Research
CONRAD Contraceptive Research and Development Program
DVP* Dengue Vaccine Project
DNDi Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative
EMVI European Malaria Vaccine Initiative
EuroVacc EuroVacc Foundation
FIND Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics
TB Alliance Global Alliance for TB Drug Development
HHVI Human Hookworm Vaccine Initiative
IDRI Infectious Disease Research Institute
IOWH Institute for One World Health
IAVI International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
IPM International Partnership for Microbicides
LFI Lassa Fever Initiative
MVI Malaria Vaccine Initiative
MMV Medicines for Malaria Venture
MVP Meningitis Vaccine Project at WHO/PATH
PDVI Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative
Notes: *CICCR, DVP, and LFI have been left out of the analysis because of insufficient data.
Source: Initiative on Public–Private Partnerships for Health (IPPPH), http://www.ippph.org, July 13
2006.
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of the opportunities and limitations of public–private partnering as a system of
governance. Secondly, it intends to lay the grounds for developing an analytical
tool that helps decision makers to assess when partnering is preferable to other
means of cooperation, and how GHP governance structures need to be designed
to deliver effective outcomes.
2. Public–private partnerships: just a fad?
Making a case for Global Health Partnerships
Examining the still narrow literature on GHP governance reveals that the dis-
cussion is strongly biased towards issues of accountability and legitimacy rather
than informing about determinants of effectiveness.2 Even though both aspects
often go hand in hand, there are important differences: whereas effectiveness
refers to the role institutions play as determinants of the content of individual
and collective behaviour, legitimacy is concerned with normative concerns of
fairness and equity (Young, 1992: 164). To be sure, the latter dimension needs
to be addressed carefully and there is vast agreement that rules need to be estab-
lished to increase the legitimacy of GHPs.
Yet, having said this, the normative spin of the governance debate oversha-
dows the question what makes partnering a viable option for potential contri-
butors at all: this, however, is an important question since partnering as a
form of ‘governance without government’ is largely a voluntary mechanism of
cooperation rather than a construction built on coercion. That means, the gov-
erning structures of GHPs do not only need to respond to – however defined –
normative considerations of equity and fairness but they also need to take into
account the varying interests of the stakeholders to attract their voluntary con-
tributions. Kettler and Towse (2001: 63) make this point clear: ‘if the only issue
is democratic legitimacy and [the] delivery [of outcomes] is assumed to be
straightforward then the case for PPPs is weak’. Yet, as the authors go on, ‘it
is precisely because delivery is extremely difficult (and costly compared to the
size of existing international agency budgets for this type of product develop-
ment) that PPPs become an attractive option’.
Still, the comparative advantage of industry in the R&D process is a strong
argument for contracting out research and development to private corporations
(‘private sector participation’) but not necessarily for partnering. Apart from
that, also financial bottlenecks provide only an insufficient explanation for part-
nering since these supposedly could be overcome through alternative mecha-
nisms such as Advanced Market Commitments, tax credits, lower regulatory
2 Particularly prominent is the concept of good governance in international organizations (see Woods,
1999). It provides the theoretical foundations in studies such as Buse (2004a, 2004b), Buse and Waxman
(2001), Buse and Harmer (2004), Buse and Walt (2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b), Kickbusch and Buse
(2006).
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fees or fast-track approvals (Widdus, 2001: 716; Moran, 2005b: 16). These
mechanisms have the advantage to keep the border between the public and
the private clear, with the latter providing the institutional framework for the
former to generate socially optimal results.
So, after all, does that suggest GHPs are no more than a passing fashion,
questionable from both normative considerations of political legitimacy and
also positive considerations of effectiveness? As the following sections argue,
the answer is in the negative: one point of retreat for defenders of GHPs
remains, and taking a closer look at it reveals its high relevance for many pro-
blems of global public policy making: in situations where the complexity of
jointly produced outcomes is high, imperfect information lets the costs of mar-
ket transactions rise and complete contracts covering all eventualities become
infeasible. In the corporate world, such situations provide an important ratio-
nale for building alliances, joint ventures, mergers, and takeovers. Analogously,
the problem of incomplete contracts also provides a strong rationale for global
alliances between the public and the private sector.
As follows, the paper needs to address two questions: (i) what makes partner-
ships more effective than other systems of governance and when? (ii) How do
global health partnerships need to be structured to create benefits for all stake-
holders, so that they engage in voluntary cooperation?
Theoretical framework: incomplete contracting
Paradoxically, neoclassical economics does not know organizations: strictly
speeking, it starts out from the idea of individuals interacting on spot markets.
The reason for that is the assumption of perfectly informed actors and zero
transaction costs. Thus, an important argument for the existence of organiza-
tions comes into view with the assumption of positive transaction costs: Coase
suggests that transactions will be organized in a firm when the costs of doing so
are below the costs of using the market (Coase, 1937). This can be the case
when the good to be exchanged is complex, or when the contract spans a
long time period, making it infeasible to specify all eventualities upfront. To
give an example: suppose there is a buyer G and a vendor N of a good. Further-
more, suppose both need to make specific investments into the relationship: N,
for instance, purchases a certain machine, whereas G makes infrastructure
investments adapted to the product delivered by N. Suppose both investments
cannot be easily transferred to another purpose, i.e. they lose value in the case
of disagreement. As a matter of consequence – even if beforehand both actors
could chose between many providers – once the investments are sunk, there
exists a certain degree of interdependence, giving each party some bargaining
power over the other.
The bargaining power of both depends to large extend on their respective
relative costs of exit, their disagreement payoff (see Hirschman, 1970: 21).
The costs of exit of a party increase the more relationship specific investments
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it makes. If now the assumption is made that for each party the specific invest-
ments of the other are hard to observe, both anticipate the ex post bargaining
over the surplus ex ante in their business negotiations (see Tirole, 1986). The
result is an inefficient Nash equilibrium, i.e. individual strategic behaviour leads
to hold-up problems and underinvestment (Besley and Ghatak, 2001: 1344).
Transaction cost theory suggests for such a situation of interdependence to
organize the deal within one organization instead of using the market. This,
however, potentially creates a new problem as Grossman and Hart (1986)
make clear: suppose G buys N, the former cannot be sure that N does not
turn from a self-interested owner to an equally self-interested employee
(p. 692). In other words, integration merely ‘shifts the incentives for opportunis-
tic and distortionary behaviour; but it does not remove these incentives’ (ibid.:
716).
This has two opposing consequences: on the one hand, G’s incentive to make
relationship-specific investments increases with the acquisition since it gives him
residual control rights over the assets of N. On the other hand, integration
diminishes incentives for N to make relationship-specific investments since N
will now receive a smaller fraction of the ex post surplus.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the baseline model of incomplete con-
tracting theory (as follows ICT): (i) The impossibility of making complete con-
tracts in the case of complex transactions provide organizations with an
incentive to integrate when their activities are complementary, i.e. when there
is a certain degree of perceived interdependence between their investment deci-
sions. (ii) The organization with relatively more important relationship-specific
investments has a stronger incentive to gain residual control rights over the
other because it potentially suffers more from a weaker bargaining position.
GHPs as response to dual market failures
The previous section laid the grounds for establishing a theoretical rationale for
organizational integration as an alternative to market transactions: GHPs can
be interpreted as a response to dual market failures:
1. At the first level extreme poverty leads to lack of effective demand for the crea-
tion of market-financed innovative products for health. This has been exacer-
bated by important dynamics of economic globalization in the pharmaceutical
industry: since the 1980s the branch saw the emergence of ‘big pharma’, a surge
of global mergers and acquisitions which let the business to consolidate from
formerly 25 down to 15 big players with more than US $10 bn. healthcare
revenue each in 2004.3 This development has driven these companies to focus
on areas offering ever-higher returns, which let the typical peak sales threshold
for drug R&D candidates increase around US $500 millions per year.
3 Source: MedAdNews, www.pharmalive.com.
Global public–private partnerships against neglected diseases 35
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133107004392
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:24:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
As a consequence, the project selection process in companies got more competi-
tive, and opportunity costs associated with investment in ND R&D rose.
Companies such as Roche, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Abbott, Lilly, or Wyeth
entirely closed down their infectious diseases divisions (Moran, 2005b: 9;
Buse and Walt, 2000a: 552; Tarabusi and Vickery, 1998a, 1998b).
2. Not only the demand side but also the supply side suffers from potential market
failures: pharmaceutical research is a highly complex endeavour and requires
project specific investments, which are difficult to observe, understand, or verify
for the recipient of the good. Not only the private but also the public sector
needs to make investments throughout the different stages of the R&D process,
e.g. in terms of technical, scientific, and clinical neglected disease expertise;
access to facilities pharmaceutical corporations no longer have (e.g. parasite
houses, developing country trial sites); or regional experience (e.g. dealing
with developing country health authorities) (Moran, 2005b: 13). Thus, all par-
ties make financial, human, and physical contributions to the common project
according to their respective comparative advantage. The complementarity of
the inputs and the complexity of the production process give rise to contracting
problems in a situation of complex interdependence. Since this is prone to result
in opportunistic and inefficient strategic behaviour, there is a need for organiza-
tional integration.
3. Effective governance structures
An incomplete contracting approach
So far, the analysis allows for an explanation of why R&D partnerships can be
potentially superior to market transactions. Yet, as the theory suggests above,
integration per se´ is not enough to solve hold-up problems and improving overall
effectiveness: it is decisive who has the residual rights over the assets brought into
the partnerships, i.e. who owns the GHP. So, the question is: what ownership
structures provide effective outcomes under what circumstances? Answering
this question requires the assumptions of the ICT baseline model to be modified
in two respects: (i) the product of the partnership has (to large extent) a public
rather than private good character; (ii) the actors value the outcome of the part-
nership to different degrees, with the private for-profit actor, in the extreme
case, not valuing it at all.
Public sector versus non-government organizations’ (NGO) ownership
of partnerships – the theory
Roughly, the life of a GHP can be described as a three-stage process: (1) In the
formation negotiations, the parties decide over setting up the partnership. They
have to agree over the objectives of the research, how the project will be man-
aged, and over the obligations of each party. A central subject of these negotia-
tions is the representation of stakeholders in the Governing Board that is the
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owner of the assets brought into the partnership (i.e. it has residual control
rights over the assets contributed by the donors). (II) The Governing Board
and the CEO decide over the investments that are henceforth to be sunk
(relationship specific). (III) After a normally predetermined project phase, the
stakeholders evaluate the outcomes and bargain over whether to continue the
project and with whom.
As the theoretical framework suggests, the formation of a partnership per se´
is not yet a solution to the problem of incomplete contracting: once the actors
have arrived in phase II, they will – analogously to the corporate case – still
be in a situation of interdependence, which potentially leads to hold-up pro-
blems. To avoid this, a proper governance structure is crucial: in the corporate
case, the proposition is that the stakeholder with the relatively more important
investment is the one facing higher costs of exit once the investment is sunk.
This puts them in a weaker ex post bargaining situation, so that they would
invest more if they became the owner of the project (which would improve their
bargaining position). Yet, in an organization which produces a public good, the
situation is different because the residual control (i.e. ownership) over the assets
contributed to the venture and the residual income derived from these assets are
largely decoupled: when the output of a partnership is a public good, the party
which values this good the most derives the largest benefits no matter who is the
owner. In other words, ownership does not implicate a better bargaining
position since the party valuing the outcome more also benefits more whether
or not it is directly involved! This has an important implication for the less
caring investor: their bargaining position now improves when they transfer
ownership rights to the higher valuation party, supposing the latter cannot
complete the project without them. This leads to an important conclusion: the
investments of the less caring party are higher when they are not the owner of
the project. In contrast to the baseline model, the overall surplus is always
higher when the more caring party retains ownership (see Besley and Ghatak,
2001: 1353).
Strictly speeking, the analysis up to this point only provides propositions in the
extreme case (total public versus totalNGOownership). Yet, when is joint owner-
ship preferable? A simple example illustrates: if a conflict arises in a two-
stakeholder partnershipwhere ownership rights arewith stakeholderGwho deci-
des to dismiss N, the latter would still earn a positive residual income from the
partnership since it is public. In case of joint ownership, however, which means
in the most extreme case that every Board Member is a veto power, the project
cannot go on when there is disagreement, so that the disagreement payoffs are
zero. Thus, in practice joint ownership means that the relatively less caring party
achieves an even better bargaining position than in the case above, which poten-
tially improves its investment incentives. Such a setting is preferable when the suc-
cess of the partnership depends largely on, or even entirely on, the investment of
the less caring party (Besley and Ghatak, 2001: 1356). This is particularly the
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case when there is a wealth constraint for the other stakeholders, meaning it is
impossible for them to go on without the investment of the less caring party: a
typical scenario in neglected diseases R&D.
The propositions the ICT perspective yields are illustrated in Figure 1, which
distinguishes between public sector agents and non-profit private agents. The
former group of actors consists of national development agencies (e.g. DFID,
USAID), public research institutions and universities, and multilateral bodies
(e.g. UNAIDS, WHO). The group of non-profit private agents encompasses
NGOs and philanthropic funds (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation, Bill and Melinda
Gates foundation).
The figure suggests that when the most caring party is also contributing the
relatively more important investment to the partnership, it should own the pro-
ject (quadrants 2 and 3). It furthermore suggests that the more caring party
should be the owner even if the other party invests relatively more (quadrants
1b and 4a). Only if there were a large gap between valuation and funding would
there be a case for joint ownership (quadrants 1a and 4b).
Public versus NGO ownership of partnerships – the evidence
The theoretical deliberations above yield the following concluding proposition:
in the public goods case the effectiveness of a partnership is greater when the
higher valuation party owns the project no matter who is the investor, given
that there is no major wealth constraint. Otherwise, there is a case for joint
ownership.
Figure 1. Public versus non-profit private ownership of a GHP
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The raw data for the following analysis are collected from official statements
of GHPs, as well as from the IPPPH partnership database4 (see Annex:
Table A1). They show 17 out of 20 R&D GHPs presently operating.5 Table 2
draws on these data to calculate differences among these partnerships with
regard to voting power in the governing bodies and financial contributions.
The variable %PUB in Table 2 is the share of the total investment in the
GHP contributed by public stakeholders. As the table shows, almost all invest-
ments, i.e. %FUN (¼ 1 %PUB), comes from private funds, rather than from
corporate investors (Figure 2). Overall, the data suggest that there is a clear
trend in the field of ND research towards the establishment of jointly owned
GHPs. Another indicator for this is the fact that GHPs increasingly take the
form of legally independent organizations or organizations hosted within
NGOs. Publicly owned partnerships, on the other hand, gradually lose impor-
tance (see Table 3; nine of 13 so far discontinued partnerships have been hosted
by the public sector).
The parameter %INO (‘investor ownership’) in Table 2 describes the share
of votes held by all investors: comparing this parameter with %PUB shows
no correlation.
An even clearer picture emerges when disaggregating %INO into two
variables: %PRD (‘private donor ownership’) describes the percentage of votes
going to private funds, whereas %PUD (‘public donor ownership’) describes
the votes held by donor countries and multilateral donor agencies. Comparing
the contributions of private funds (%FUN) with their ownership share
(%PRD) shows no correlation (Table 4): compared to their investment they
always have very little influence in the GHP. This confirms the main proposi-
tion of the ICT perspective on GHPs: investment and ownership are in the pub-
lic good case not necessarily correlated.
Interestingly, as Table 4 illustrates, comparing the contributions of public
donors (%PUB) and their voice in the GHP (%PUD) shows that they remain
correlated: a larger investment usually results in stronger representation. A pos-
sible interpretation is that governments invest more in partnerships that serve
their own interest. In fact, there may be some evidence for that interpretation,
when baring in mind that the literature usually differentiates between two dis-
tinct driving forces behind global health partnering: (a) the acknowledgement
that good health in LMICs constitutes a value in itself and is a prerequisite
for economic development, and (b) the perception that NDs in LMICs may
become a threat for HICs per se´. It can be assumed that the latter concern
applies less to diseases that are bound to certain geographical or climatic areas
4 www.ippph.org.
5 The partnerships which have been left out (CICCR, DVP, and LFI) did not provide sufficient infor-
mation.
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Table A1. Distribution of ownership and investment in R&D GHPs
Name* LS Diseases* * Finance (Mill. US$) Ownership (Board Votes)
Public Private Total
Invest
%Pub Public Private Total
BoardGov/Mu. Funds Corp. Gov/Mu. Other %DEC Funds Exp. Corp. %DEC
Aeras IND TB 4.47 107.90 0.00 112.37 4% 0 3 33% 1 4 2 0% 10
CDND PS LEI, MAL, HAT 2.20 15.10 0.00 17.30 13% 0 3 0% 1 0 0 0% 4
CONRAD NP HIV/AIDS 72.00 50.41 0.00 122.41 59% 3 0 0% 0 2 0 50% 5
DNDi IND CD, LEI, MAL, HAT 0.47 32.50 0.00 32.97 1% 5 0 80% 1 3 0 0% 9
EMVI NP MAL 8.50 0.00 0.00 8.50 100% 6 1 14% 0 0 1 0% 8
EuroVacc IND HIV/AIDS 2.80 0.00 0.00 2.80 100% 0 6 0% 0 0 2 0% 8
FIND IND TB 0.00 30.00 0.00 30.00 0% 1 0 100% 1 1 1 0% 4
HHVI NP HHI 0.00 39.80 0.00 39.80 0% 0 1 100% 0 5 0 20% 6
IAVI IND HIV/AIDS 112.69 151.60 0.00 264.29 43% 5 0 60% 0 4 4 13% 13
IDRI IND CD, LEI, LEP, MAL, TB 0.00 15.00 0.00 15.00 0% 0 4 0% 0 4 0 0% 8
IOWH IND CD, LEI, LEP, MAL, DIA 0.00 62.96 0.00 62.96 0% 0 0 0% 2 3 3 0% 8
IPM IND HIV/AIDS 19.42 75.15 0.00 94.58 21% 2 2 50% 0 5 3 13% 12
MMV IND MAL 40.74 193.82 1.30 235.85 17% 3 0 33% 1 7 1 22% 12
MVI NP MAL 0.00 257.60 0.50 258.10 0% 2 2 75% 0 4 2 17% 10
MVP NP MEN 0.00 70.00 0.00 70.00 0% 2 2 75% 0 4 2 17% 10
PDVI PS DEN 0.00 56.08 0.00 56.08 0% 8 6 71% 0 9 2 9% 25
TB Alliance IND TB 2.00 40.15 0.00 42.15 5% 1 3 0% 1 3 3 17% 11
Notes: * see Table 1 for full names.
** Global Security Threats: HIV ¼ HIV/AIDS; MAL ¼Malaria; TB ¼ Tuberculosis; Regional Development Threat: CD ¼ Chagas; DEN ¼ Dengue; DIA ¼
Diarrhoeal Dis.; HAT ¼ Human African Trypanosomiasis; HHI ¼ Human Hookworm Infection; LEI ¼ Leishmaniasis; LEP ¼ Leprosy; MEN ¼ Meningitis;
ROT ¼ Rotavirus
Legend: Gov/Mu. ¼ Governments & Multilateral Organizations; Funds ¼ Private Philanthropic Foundations; Corp. ¼ For-Profit Private Actor; %Pub ¼ Public
Sector share of overall investments;%DEC ¼ share of Disease Endemic Countries; Exp. ¼Health Experts (Private Board Members which do not contribute funds).
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Table 2. Investments, voting power and project valuation
Name* Partnership Focus %PUB %FUN %INO %PRD %PUD %PUO %COR
Aeras Global Security Threat 4% 96% 30% 10% 20% 30% 20%
CONRAD Global Security Threat 59% 41% 60% 0% 60% 60% 0%
EMVI Global Security Threat 100% 0% 75% 0% 75% 88% 13%
EuroVacc Global Security Threat 100% 0% 75% 0% 75% 75% 25%
FIND Global Security Threat 0% 100% 25% 25% 0% 25% 25%
IAVI Global Security Threat 43% 57% 15% 0% 15% 38% 31%
IPM Global Security Threat 21% 79% 17% 0% 17% 33% 25%
MMV Global Security Threat 17% 83% 25% 8% 17% 25% 8%
MVI Global Security Threat 0% 100% 10% 0% 10% 40% 20%
TB Alliance Global Security Threat 5% 95% 45% 9% 40% 40% 27%
CDND Regional Development Threat 13% 87% 100% 25% 75% 75% 0%
DNDi Regional Development Threat 1% 99% 22% 11% 11% 56% 0%
HHVI Regional Development Threat 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0%
IDRI Regional Development Threat 0% 100% 50% 0% 50% 50% 0%
IOWH Regional Development Threat 0% 100% 25% 25% 0% 0% 38%
MVP Regional Development Threat 0% 100% 10% 0% 10% 40% 20%
PDVI Regional Development Threat 0% 100% 16% 0% 16% 56% 8%
Notes:
%PRD ¼ (Private Donor Votes / Boards Size) * 100 %PUB ¼ (Public Inv. / Total Inv.) * 100
%PUD ¼ (Public Donor Votes / Boards Size) * 100 %FUN ¼ (Private Inv. / Total Inv.) * 100
%PUO ¼ (All Public Votes / Board Size) * 100 %INO ¼ (All Donor Votes / Board Size) * 100
%COR ¼ (Corporate Votes / Board Size) * 100
Source: Table A1
Figure 2. Financial contributions to R&D GHPs (in %)
Source: Moran, 2005a: 33
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or affect only relatively few people (‘Regional Development Threats’). Thus,
from an ICT perspective, it is more likely that philanthropic funds invest into
the fight against Regional Development Threats, whereas public donors focus
more on major epidemics, which are not geographically bound or potentially
dangerous for a large number of people, including those from developed coun-
tries (e.g. tourists traveling in malaria-risk areas). Furthermore, it is fair to
assume that in the case of Regional Development Threats, NGOs and local gov-
ernments are the most caring parties and have a larger share of the votes.
Table 2 provides some preliminary evidence that these assumptions hold
true: it suggests that HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB are major epidemics which
constitute a ‘Global Security Threat’. Diseases like Chagas, Dengue, or Leish-
maniasis are mostly health threats connected to local conditions non-existent
in HICs. Obviously public donors play only a minor role in contributing finan-
cially to R&D for the latter (see Figure 3). Also, the assumptions regarding
ownership are supported by the evidence: in the four most important GHPs
against regional threats, i.e. DNDi, IOWH, MVP, and PDVI, public donors
Table 3. Discontinued R&D GHPs
Name End date
Action TB Programme (ATBP) 2003
Development of Norplant n.a.
Development of Vaccine Vial Monitors (VVMs) n.a.
Intercompany Collaboration for AIDS Drug Development (ICCADD) 2003
Japanese WHO Malaria Drug Partnership (JPMW) 2004
Lapdap Antimalarial Product Development (LAPDAP) 2004
Meningitis C Vaccine Development and Supply in UK 2003
Microbicides Development Programme (MDP) 2006
Syringes – Autodestruct Development n.a.
TROPIVAL n.a.
Tuberculosis Diagnostics Initiative (TBDI) n.a.
Source: Initiative on Public–Private Partnerships for Health (IPPPH), http://www.ippph.org, 13 July
2006.
Table 4. Correlations: investments and project ownership
%PUB (Public Investment Share)
%INO (Overall Investor Ownership) 0.457*
%PUO (Overall Public Ownership) 0.517*
%PRD (Private Investor Ownership) –0.247
%PUD (Public Investor Ownership) 0.526*
%COR (Corporate Investor Ownership) 0.020
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Table 2.
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have no significant ownership. Furthermore, with the exception of IOWH, these
GHPs transferred significant ownership rights to Disease Endemic Countries
(DEC) governments (this conclusion can be derived from calculating the differ-
ence between %PUD and %PUO: the former describes donor country owner-
ship, the latter refers to overall public ownership, including DEC).
Non-profit versus for-profit stakeholder ownership
So far, the discussion focused on the trade-off between public and non-profit
private ownership of GHPs. Now, to round up the ICT perspective on GHP
governance, the corporate sector needs to be recognized. The key assumption
made is that business gets no intrinsic value from the project. That means, since
implementing a project is costly the company would not complete it in case of
disagreement: it engages in the project only because of the payments it receives
from the non-profit agent.
This brings the analysis back to the baseline ICT model. If the private sector,
say a pharmaceutical company, receives ownership over an ND drug project,
Figure 3. Public investment, public ownership, and disease type
Source: Table 2.
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it has two options: (a) increasing relationship-specific investments and then nego-
tiating with the purchaser to pay a higher price; (b) decreasing relationship-
specific investments and delivering a poorer product. When (a) is difficult to
accomplish, adverse consequences of (non-contractible) cost cutting on (non-
contractible) quality of the delivered product potentially occurs once ownership
rights are transferred to the private company. The greater the danger of this
opportunistic behaviour, the greater becomes the case for public ownership
instead of transferring residual control rights to the company (Hart et al., 1997:
1130). So, if large non-contractible cost reductions have large deleterious conse-
quences for the effectiveness of the GHP, the case for private ownership is small.
If opportunistic behaviour can be controlled for through contract or competition
(e.g. if the good has a private good component), there is a stronger case for private
ownership since then such an arrangement potentially increases efficiency
through cost reductions and/or quality innovations. Against the background
that ND research is a complex process and assuming that pharmaceutical compa-
nies are profit-maximizing actors, the case for industry ownership seems small.
However, two qualifications can be made to this ‘first guess’:
1. In the ND R&D case corporate stakeholders often make in-kind contributions
(e.g. laboratory access, general technological expertise), rather than financial
contributions. So, no matter if they formally own the project or not, they retain
residual control rights over these assets in case of disagreement, which improves
their bargaining position. This is particularly the case if the assets contributed
are not relationship specific, i.e. they may be transferred easily to other pur-
poses. Thus, the degree of corporate ownership can be assumed to increase if
its investment is sufficiently more important and/or less relationship specific.
2. There are production processes with a ‘double bottom line’, yielding both a pub-
lic and a private good component. This, for instance, may be the case when a
drug is agreed to be used for commercialization in HICs whilst being provided
at low cost in LMICs. This creates incentives for joint ownership: suppose a pri-
vate actor P has an investment project but does not want to finance it himself
since he would then bear the whole risk. When the project has a double bottom
line, P has an incentive to take in a non-profit investor J who is less risk averse.
J is offered as payoff a sizable fraction of the project’s benefit (the fraction that
J later intents to make public). Then, in order to prevent P from withholding this
ex post, J would ask P in advance to hand over some control, for example by
giving him ownership rights over some of the assets (see Grossman and Hart,
1986: 717). Particularly, large charitable foundations increasingly fancy such
an approach, giving rise to a new form of philanthrocapitalism, or ‘venture phi-
lanthropy’ (Economist, 2006).
Figure 4 illustrates the argument: if a product is a private good and the cor-
poration is the sole investor, it would own the project (quadrant 2). If the good
is public and the investment is not for profit, the project would be owned either
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by the public sector or by a private not-for-profit actor, depending on the
criteria above (quadrant 3). Double bottom line ventures would be either
owned entirely by the corporation (quadrant 1b) when public contributions
are small (e.g. tax credits) or are jointly owned as in the case of projects
financed through ’venture philanthropic’ investment (quadrant 1a). If the
project outcome is public but a share of the investment is corporate, the project
would still be owned by the public agent (quadrant 4a), unlike the investment of
the for-profit stakeholder is sufficiently more important or less relationship spe-
cific (quadrant 4b).
Non-profit versus for-profit stakeholder ownership – the evidence
The deliberations above yield the following propositions: the effectiveness of a
partnership between the for-profit and the non-profit sector is greater when
the latter retains ownership unlike when (a) the good has a sizable private
good component or (b) the investment of the for-profit stakeholder is suffi-
ciently more important and/or less relationship specific. In the latter situations,
there is a case for joint ownership.
As Table 2 shows, it is striking that %COR (‘corporate ownership’) is posi-
tive for 12 out of 17 GHPs. That means corporations have a voice in most
GHPs, albeit they do not tend to make financial contributions. Yet, in all
observed cases, the voice of corporate stakeholders is minor compared to the
voice of public actors. Furthermore, the Board members with the background
Figure 4. Not-for-profit (public and private) versus corporate ownership
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of a for-profit organization are not necessarily from the companies that are
involved in the R&D activity of the partnership.
A closer look at industry partners shows that various factors determine the
private sector’s motives to invest in GHPs and to secure (or not to secure) own-
ership rights. The motives vary between Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
and Small and Medium sized Companies (SMCs).
ForMNCs, there are twomajor rationales to investing in anR&Dpartnership:
(1) the partnership generates private good components, which the MNC may
appropriate and commercialize. This is either the case if the partnership yields
products or product components that can also be sold in more attractive markets
(e.g. HIV/AIDS treatments), or if an incentive regime has been set up to make the
project profitable. The 1983 US Orphan Drug Act, for instance, makes firms that
develop drugs for rare diseases eligible for a 50% tax credit on their clinical devel-
opment expenses, provides clinical research grants, ensures priority review and
fast track development status, and guarantees a seven-yearmarket exclusivity per-
iod. A more recent incentive mechanism is Advance Market Commitments
(AMC), which create a guaranteed demand for a drug, or vaccine before it is on
the market. In February 2007, a pilot AMC has been set up by the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation and five donour countries to spur the development
of a vaccine against Pneumococcal disease.
(2) MNC investments into R&D partnerships can also have non-commercial
reasons ormay be linked to long-term business considerations. These include stra-
tegies to improve the corporate image and the prevention of risks to reputation,
which may result from a failure to address developing country needs (Buse and
Walt, 2002b: 175). They may also include an early positioning in emerging
LMIC markets or access to high-skilled low-cost developing country researchers.
Moran (2005b: 17) stresses that in the realm of drug development such motives
currently provide the dominant driver for MNCs to contribute to GHPs.
The varying motives for large pharmaceutical companies to participate in a
GHP also determine ownership structures. When, as in the first setting, the
R&D project is supposed to yield an immediate profit for the MNC, there is
a strong case for private ownership. The pneumococcal vaccine PREVANAR,
for instance, has been developed by the pharma company Wyeth on a commer-
cial basis and was incorporated into various childhood immunization programs
around the world. In the context of the recent launch of an AMC for pneumo-
coccal vaccines, the company announced the development of an advanced pneu-
mococcal vaccine with a broader coverage.
The case for joint ownership of MNCs in GHPs increases with the impor-
tance of the contribution of the public sector to the venture. Table 2 provides
some evidence that the degree of MNC ownership is larger in partnerships
like IAVI, which are tackling global security threats, than in others, which are
tackling local development threats. Arguably, this can be linked to larger
private good components in the former.
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When, as in the second case, the R&D project itself is not supposed to yield
an immediate profit, MNCs prefer to share the burden of the investment in
what is called a ‘no-profit-no-loss’ model: they provide early pipeline R&D,
which is relatively cheap and relationship unspecific, and leave the relatively
expensive late-stage clinical development to the public partner (Moran,
2005b). In such a setting, ownership usually stays with the latter. GSK, for
instance, is involved in various early stage Malaria and TB projects with
MMV and the TB Alliance, without being represented on the organizations’
Boards. Also, Novartis is involved in partnerships with both GHPs without
being represented on their respective Boards. Sanofi-Aventis collaborates with
DNDi without having formal project ownership rights. The case for joint own-
ership would only grow if the contribution of the MNC was sufficiently impor-
tant. In the set of GHPs examined by this paper, this has not been the case.
Whereas MNCs do not necessarily need to draw an immediate commercial
benefit from their ND research, SMCs tend to work on a fully paid basis.
Around half of today’s neglected disease drug projects are conducted with the
contribution of SMCs (Moran, 2005b). Some of these are Contract Research
Organizations (CROs) such as Quintiles or Covance, which produce research
on demand. Since tasks outsourced to CROs can usually be clearly defined
and measured, they collaborate on a transactional basis and do not obtain own-
ership rights.
A second group is SMCs, which specialize on the niche market of ND pro-
duct development (e.g. Zentaris, Immtech). Their key driver is the expectation
of profits from sales of the final product to the ND market itself. Cooperations
with these companies fit into quadrant 1a, b, or quadrant 2 of Figure 4, depend-
ing on to what degree they trade residual rights over their assets against contri-
butions of the non-profit partners. Among the partnerships outlined in Table 2,
the Institute for One World Health (IOWH) belongs to this still rather small
group of SMCs specializing in neglected disease markets.
4. Conclusion
Policy implications and research agenda
This paper started out from the assertion that due to the normative bias of
the debate on GHP governance one fact is usually vastly ignored: GHPs
are voluntary systems of cooperation and hence need to yield benefits to
all participating parties to be effective. Because of that, this paper suggested
a new perspective on GHP governance based on incomplete contracting the-
ory. The purpose of this was to answer the questions why GHPs are poten-
tially more effective than market-based transactions between public and
private agents, and what the positive criteria are that their governance struc-
tures need to correspond to.
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The answer offered to the first question is that GHPs may overcome critical
hold-up problems emerging through inefficient strategic behaviour of market
actors when the complexity of a transaction makes complete, contingent con-
tracts infeasible. Yet, as the theory shows as well, this transaction costs argu-
ment needs to be qualified, since organizational integration also produces
adverse incentives for the partners. Because of that, the paper suggests that sys-
tematically weighting the benefits of integration against its harms in terms of
adverse incentives must be the key to solving the second puzzle regarding posi-
tive criteria of governance. Several propositions could be derived this way: the
distribution of ownership rights in a GHP needs to correspond to: (i) the degree
to which the respective parties value the partnership outcome, (ii) to the relative
importance of the investment of the parties, and (iii) the nature of the partner-
ship outcome produced. The empirical sections of the paper were able to sup-
port the theoretical ICT assumption on GHP governance.
It is important to point out that the empirical findings provided are not suffi-
cient yet to establish an immediate causal relation between certain forms of gov-
ernance and partnership effectiveness. Yet, they are clear enough to give the
GHP governance debate a new spin by informing it about which constellations
(ownership structures) are potentially more effective under which circumstances
(nature of the good, wealth constraints of the actors, etc.) and which potentially
fail. However, to be sure, the findings in this paper can complement but not
replace a sophisticated normative debate on the consequences of public–private
partnering: the ICT framework may explain why and under what circumstances
a multilateral organization needs to trade some voting power against private
contributions. It remains necessarily silent on the question of whether these cir-
cumstances per se´ are desirable.
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the explanatory power of the model as such,
as well as the empirical examination provided in the analysis. To begin with the
former, it is important to point out that the theoretical perspective developed
above provides a causal argument. The problems inherent to such a neopositi-
vist epistemology to international politics (see Young, 1992: 163, footnote)
are well known, and interpretive questions, such as how far partnering in turn
changes the ideas and self-conceptions of the involved actors over time, are an
important field to explore in the future. With regard to the empirical examina-
tion provided in this paper, it is necessary to point out its preliminary nature: in
the future, a deeper and broader analysis is required to sustain the propositions
made above. The analysis needs to go deeper in the sense that measures of own-
ership, reduced in this study to voting rights in governing boards, should take
into account more aspects, such as the influence of host organizations or infor-
mal networks. It would also be useful to deepen the analysis of partnership
outcomes at different stages of the R&D process and corresponding implica-
tions for governance structures (e.g. basic research as a big public good compo-
nent, as it generates knowledge, while late R&D stage development is more
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product-specific and so has a larger private good component). Furthermore, the
analysis needs to be broadened: it should be applied to a larger number of the
more than 400 global partnerships existing today in various policy areas.
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